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INTRODUCTION 
In the thirty-plus years since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
1
 
revolutionized content-based broadcast regulation, much has 
changed.  Although broadcast television was recognized as a 
dangerously pervasive medium in 1978,
2
 it is no longer the 
dominant force that it once was, with the vast majority of 
Americans now paying for subscription television services like 
cable or satellite.
3
  While the Pacifica Court strove to support 
parents in their struggle to protect their children from pervasive 
inappropriate content by upholding the Federal Communication 
Commission‟s content regulation,4 technological developments 
like the V-Chip, cable boxes, DVRs, and satellite boxes have 
afforded modern parents various self-help alternatives. 
Many critics have argued that changes like these in the 
convergent media environment have obviated any need for the 
Supreme Court to evaluate the constitutionality of broadcast 
speech regulations with special deference, or so-called 
“intermediate scrutiny.”5  They contend that broadcast restrictions 
should instead be evaluated like all other content-based media 
regulation, with “strict scrutiny.”6  Some have suggested that no 
content-based television regulation could pass constitutional 
muster under a strict scrutiny test because new self-help media 
filters like the V-Chip necessarily present a less restrictive means 
 
*  Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.  J.D., Northwestern University School of 
Law; M.B.A., Kellogg Graduate School of Management.  I would like to thank Bob 
Lebailly, Professor Rachel Davis Mersey, and Professor Jim Speta for their invaluable 
guidance on this project.  I am also very grateful to Professor Michael P. Smith and the 
Media Management Center for providing the funding that made the study possible. 
 1 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 2 Id. at 748. 
 3 NIELSEN, TELEVISION AUDIENCE 2009 1 (2010), available at http://blog.nielsen.com/ 
nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/TVA_2009-for-Wire.pdf. See also Innovation in 
the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and Improvements to 
VHF, FCC 10-196, ET Docket No. 10-235 at 38 (Nov. 30, 2010) (statement of Julius 
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC) (noting that “less than 10% of Americans receive 
broadcast television only through over-the-air spectrum signals”). 
 4 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 5 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Charting a New Constitutional Jurisprudence for the 
Digital Age, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 373, 389–90 (2009). 
 6 See id. 
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of controlling indecent or profane speech.
7
  These arguments have 
found welcome ears in some courts, most notably the Second 
Circuit.  Upon hearing Fox v. FCC on remand from the Supreme 
Court, the court pulled no punches in forcefully arguing that 
changes in the technology landscape should unravel any special 
First Amendment status for broadcast speech restrictions.
8
 
Unfortunately, both law review articles and judicial opinions 
that have lobbied against content-based broadcasting regulation 
have generally neglected to offer specific empirical evidence to 
support their positions.  These critics tend to focus on how new 
technology might be used in theory rather than how it is actually 
used in practice.  This approach is problematic.  If the Supreme 
Court is to uproot three decades of its broadcast speech precedent 
(as it will have the opportunity to do when it decides the next 
iteration of Fox v. FCC this term),
9
 it should do so on the basis of 
specific empirical data that directly address the status of the 
bedrock governmental interest from Pacifica: parental control over 
their children‟s exposure to pervasive content.10  Thus, it is critical 
to understand precisely how the changes in media consumption 
and technology have affected these parents and their perceptions of 
control.  It is equally important to empirically distinguish between 
the efficacies of the alternatives that the Court would consider 
under a strict scrutiny analysis: one regime based on media filters 
and another based on regulation.  Without such empirical 
 
 7 Indeed, this was precisely the position taken by the Fox television stations in the 
Supreme Court‟s most recent indecency case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox 
II”), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). Brief of Respondent at 45–48, Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800 
(2009) (No. 07-582) (“The availability of the V-Chip renders the FCC‟s content-based 
regulation of indecent speech on broadcast television unconstitutional.”).  Law review 
articles have also advanced this argument. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and 
Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 
303 (2003). 
 8 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (“Fox III”), 613 F.3d 317, 325–27 (2d Cir. 
2010).   
 9 The Court agreed to hear argument specifically on the question of whether the 
FCC‟s indecency regime is constitutional. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox 
IV”), 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).  Oral argument occurred just before this article was printed 
on January 10, 2012. No. 10-1293: Proceedings and Orders, http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1293.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).  
 10 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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considerations, it is impossible to accurately determine which 
alternative is the less restrictive method of protecting children (or 
whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has less 
restrictive ways of accomplishing its mandate). 
This study is the first to use actual survey data to examine how 
technology has changed the perspectives of parents.  With 
generous funding from the Media Management Center at 
Northwestern University,
11
 I conducted an original survey of 575 
American parents to better understand their perspectives on the 
intersection between television regulation and media filter 
technology.  Parental views are fundamental to the indecency 
inquiry because they are at the core of the First Amendment carve-
out for the content-based regulation of television broadcasting.  
The survey results offer clear empirical support for the argument 
that the FCC‟s content-based regulation of indecent and profane 
content should be deemed unconstitutional. 
Broadcast television is no longer a uniquely pervasive threat to 
parental control over what their children watch on television.  The 
survey data reveal that there is no statistically significant 
difference in perceptions of control between parents who consume 
only broadcast television in their homes and those who receive 
their television through some other means of distribution (such as 
cable or satellite).  Moreover, there is not a statistically significant 
difference between these two groups of parents in their perceptions 
of how much exposure their children have to inappropriate content 
on television.  In other words, the data show that parents do not 
perceive an underlying practical need for regulations of broadcast 
speech to be measured with any less scrutiny than regulations on 
other media.  It is not a uniquely pervasive medium. 
Second, parents overwhelmingly report that media filter 
technology like the V-chip is at least an equally effective substitute 
for government regulation of inappropriate content.  This is a 
 
 11 The Media Management Center is Northwestern University‟s media education and 
research entity, and is affiliated with the Kellogg School of Management and the Medill 
School of Journalism, Media, Integrated Marketing Communications. See About the 
Media Management Center, NORTHWESTERN UNIV., http://www.mediamanagement 
center.org/about.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
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striking finding that could justify the eradication of the FCC‟s 
authority to regulate television content at all.  Although most 
parents would like to rely on a multifaceted defense comprised of 
both technology and regulation, that position stands at odds with 
the Supreme Court‟s strict scrutiny jurisprudence.  If media filters 
are just as effective as regulation at achieving the government‟s 
interest of helping parents control what their children see, then the 
regulations should be deemed unconstitutional abridgements of the 
First Amendment. 
This paper will proceed as follows. Section I briefly 
summarizes content-based broadcast regulation in this country and 
contrasts it with how other televised content is treated under the 
First Amendment.  Next, Section II introduces the survey 
procedures.  The results are presented and analyzed in Section III, 
with tables appended to this paper. 
I. TECHNOLOGY, BROADCAST TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
A. The First Amendment and Broadcast Television 
Congress created the FCC under the Communications Act of 
1934, with a broad mandate to regulate broadcasting in the public 
interest.
12
  Congress specifically tasked the FCC with the 
responsibility of imposing penalties for “obscene, indecent, or 
profane language.”13  However, the Act also included a provision 
 
 12 Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1937); MORTON I. HAMBURG & 
STUART N. BROTMAN, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01[2] (Release 30 2011). 
 13 Communications Act of 1934 § 303(m)(4), 326, 501–02, 47 U.S.C. §§ 
303(m)(1)(D), 326, 501–02 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (“Whoever utters 
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).  The FCC defines 
“indecent” content as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.” FCC, OBSCENE, INDECENT, AND 
PROFANE BROADCASTS 1, available at  http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ 
obscene.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  Profane content is “language so grossly 
offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” Id.  
However, it should be noted that the FCC‟s definition is the subject of pending Supreme 
Court litigation. See Edward Wyatt, Justices Agree to Consider FCC Rules on Indecency, 
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against censorship,
14
 underscoring the inherent tension between the 
First Amendment and content-based broadcasting regulation.
15
  
Because obscenity has long been held to be devoid of any 
constitutional protection,
16
 the First Amendment battle is waged 
primarily over regulation concerning indecency and profanity. 
The First Amendment justification for this content-specific 
regulation has changed over time.  For many years, broadcast 
speech was given special status amidst First Amendment  concerns 
related to spectrum scarcity.
17
  However, the spectrum scarcity 
idea quickly became an anachronism in broadcast regulation,
18
 
especially with the proliferation of cable
19
 and satellite 
technologies, and, more recently, digital television.  The Court has 
 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
06/28/business/media/28fcc.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Justices%20Agree%20to%20Consid
er%20FCC%20Rules%20on%20Indecency&st=cse.   
        Obscene content must meet a three pronged test:  
(a) whether „the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards‟ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted). 
 14 Communications Act of 1934 § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006)  
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the 
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications 
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which 
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication. 
Id.  
 15 The two clauses have generally been interpreted together to imply that the FCC may 
not impose prior restraint, but can issue fines for obscene, indecent, or profane speech. 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 736–38 (1978). 
 16 Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) 
(“[W]e reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First 
Amendment”). But see MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS 68–72 (1984) (generally critiquing the rationale behind the Court‟s obscenity 
jurisprudence). 
 17 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER & NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 26:3 (2011). 
 18 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
200–08 (1987). 
 19 See id. at 239–47. 
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acknowledged criticism of the scarcity doctrine,
20
 and while it 
appears to have abandoned the theory, it has not explicitly done 
so.
21
 
In 1978, the Court defined its current stance on content-based 
broadcast regulation in the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation.
22
  The case presented the Court with an opportunity to 
determine whether the FCC had the authority to regulate the 
broadcast of George Carlin‟s “Filthy Words” monologue on the 
basis of indecency alone.
23
  The FCC emphasized that it only 
intended to regulate indecent content that aired at a time when 
there was a “reasonable risk” that children might hear it.24  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Stevens upheld the Commission‟s 
restriction of speech in this context.
25
  In so doing, he presented 
two new rationales for why broadcast speech deserved more 
limited First Amendment protection than speech communicated 
through other mediums (namely print). 
First, the Court emphasized the “uniquely pervasive presence” 
of broadcast media in American society.
26
  The Court found the 
threat of invasion of privacy into the home to be compelling, 
especially because, practically, it was difficult for consumers to 
heed content warnings when they sporadically tuned in and out.
27
  
Second, the Court found that children were especially vulnerable to 
the broadcast medium because it was so readily available and 
could corrupt them “in an instant.”28  The Court was sympathetic 
to the difficulties that parents had maintaining “authority in their 
 
 20 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984) 
(acknowledging “increasing criticism” of spectrum scarcity, and requesting further input 
from Congress or the FCC on the issue). 
 21 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing that the majority “refrain[ed] from relying on the notion of „spectrum 
scarcity‟” to reach its conclusions); SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:22. 
 22 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729–38. 
 23 Id. at 729. 
 24 Id. at 732 (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975)). 
 25 Id. at 751. 
 26 Id. at 748. 
 27 Id. at 748–49.  This position has been interpreted as a rejection of the argument that 
consumers could simply turn off programming that they found offensive. SMOLLA & 
NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:22.   
 28 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
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own household[s]” which were infiltrated by such a pervasive 
medium.
29
 
Over time, it has become clear that Pacifica‟s core interest was 
a firm commitment to helping parents control the upbringing of 
their children in the face of the pervasive cultural force of 
broadcast television.
30
  Indeed, the Court‟s desire to protect 
children from “harmful” speech was manifested in several of 
Pacifica‟s contemporary cases.31  While the Pacifica Court was 
careful to qualify that its nuisance rationale was limited and 
heavily contextual,
32
 subsequent cases maintained a firm 
commitment to protecting children.  In Sable Communications of 
California, Inc. v. FCC,
33
 the Court underscored Pacifica‟s focus 
on children, and ignored any concerns related to negative effects 
on the adult population.
34
  This treatment led some to speculate 
that the Court would never approve a 24-hour bar on indecent 
speech, since that would move beyond the protection-of-
childhood-innocence rationale that was paramount in the Pacifica 
decision.
35
  Indeed, that hypothesis was borne out through the 
Action for Children’s Television cases, where the D.C. Circuit 
prevented Congress from compelling the FCC to regulate 
indecency twenty-four hours a day.
36
  Instead, the court mandated 
that the agency must allow indecent broadcasts during a “safe 
 
 29 Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). 
 30 See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast 
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1136–39 (1996) (arguing that parental control is really at 
the core of the pervasiveness and scarcity rationales, and is the only reason that could 
justify separate treatment for broadcasting); Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My Kids 
to Watch Pornography?: Protecting Children from ―Indecent‖ Speech, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 671, 683 (2003) (writing that the state‟s interest in supporting parental 
control has “proven entirely uncontroversial”). 
 31 See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:23 (discussing these cases). 
 32 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
 33 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 34 Id. at 127–28.   
 35 See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:24 (discussing generally Sable 
Commc‟ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)). 
 36 See Action for Children‟s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509–10 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
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harbor” period between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM, when children are 
likely sleeping.
37
 
The Court‟s Pacifica decision was steeped in the notion that 
the broadcast medium was unique, and deserved less First 
Amendment protection than other media.
38
  Later cases have 
clearly articulated the lower degree of protection that broadcast 
speech receives under the First Amendment.  In Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (“Turner I”), the Court 
described its standard of review for content-based restrictions on 
broadcast speech as “less rigorous” than its standards for other 
media.
39
  Commentators have generally described this standard as 
“intermediate” scrutiny.40  The Court has stated that it will uphold 
a restriction on broadcast speech so long as the regulation is 
“narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest,”41 a 
threshold that is significantly lower than the strict scrutiny inquiry 
used for other media.
42
 
B. Cable and Satellite Television 
Content-based regulations on multichannel video programming 
distributors (“MVPDs”) offering cable, fiber, and satellite 
television have always been treated differently than restrictions on 
broadcast speech.  In United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, the Court drew a bright line between broadcast and cable 
television specifically in the context of indecency regulation.
43
  
Rather than revert to Pacifica‟s intermediate scrutiny test, the 
Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to determine whether 
sexually-oriented cable channels could constitutionally be required 
to scramble their transmissions or limit transmission to hours when 
 
 37 Action for Children‟s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 38 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (explaining that “of all forms of 
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection”). 
 39 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). 
 40 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:27 (discussing this “intermediate” standard 
of review for broadcasting). 
 41 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).    
 42 See infra Section I.B. 
 43 United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).   
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children would not be watching (10 PM to 6 AM).
44
  Under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, the government must show that its regulation is 
the “least restrictive means” of “promot[ing] a compelling 
Government interest.”45 
In making its strict scrutiny assessment, the Playboy Court 
repeatedly emphasized that media filtering technology associated 
with cable could achieve the government‟s compelling interest of 
helping parents keep inappropriate content from their children.
46
  
The “key difference” between cable and broadcast television in the 
case was that “[c]able systems have the capacity to block unwanted 
channels on a household-by-household basis.”47  The Court ruled 
that such technology was critically important to its First 
Amendment inquiry because it could support parents while still 
allowing willing consumers to partake in the speech that they 
desired to receive.
48
  It summarily concluded that “targeted 
blocking is less restrictive than banning,”49 and deemed the 
scrambling restriction unconstitutional.
50
 
Notably, the Court has used similar filter-based logic to knock 
down regulations on Internet speech.
51
  While the Court has not 
 
 44 Id. at 808, 813.   
 45 Id. at 813 (citing Sable Commc‟ns. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 46 Id. at 815. 
 47 Id.  It is worth noting that the Court has offered slightly different rationales for 
distinguishing cable in the content-neutral context.  In Turner I, a case that dealt with the 
Cable Act‟s content-neutral must-carry provision, the Court focused on the “inherent 
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium,” harkening back to the original 
scarcity justification for regulating broadcast speech. 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994).  The 
Court distinguished that there were no significant limits on the number of cable channels, 
and no threat of signal interference. Id. at 639.  
 48 United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (“[T]argeted 
blocking enables the Government to support parental authority without affecting the First 
Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners–listeners for whom, if the speech 
is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes may be the optimal place of 
receipt.”). 
 49 Id.  This very statement is now being used by some commentators to challenge 
whether any content-based regulation on broadcast television is permissible. See infra 
Section II.C. 
 50 Id. at 827. 
 51 Id. at 814 (“[T]he mere possibility that user-based Internet screening software would 
„soon be widely available‟ was relevant to our rejection of an overbroad restriction of 
indecent cyberspeech.” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–77 (1997))).  
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heard an indecency case regarding either satellite or fiber-delivered 
television, it is reasonable to expect that they would also receive 
strict scrutiny treatment because they offer similar filtering 
capabilities.
52
  Although the FCC has not traditionally attempted to 
enforce the Telecommunications Act indecency regulations against 
MPVDs (including cable),
53
 the issue is not entirely moot because 
Congress could simply legislate content-based restrictions on those 
services as well.  Indeed, there was a significant push to do so as 
recently as 2005 (in the wake of the Janet Jackson imbroglio).
54
  
Of course, any such attempt would surely receive a prompt 
challenge in court, and the government would be required to show 
that the regulation was the least restrictive means of achieving its 
compelling interest. 
C. The Emerging Quagmire: Broadcast Meets New Media 
Technology 
The question of whether the government can continue to 
regulate broadcast speech more strictly than it can speech 
distributed via other mediums has been called the “most important 
First Amendment problem in the context of broadcast 
regulation.”55  Modern technologies have helped create a 
convergent media marketplace in which traditional media lines are 
blurred and in which media filters like those discussed in Playboy 
are widely available to parents, even for broadcast television.  A 
brief discussion of those changes will be helpful to more fully 
 
 52 See John C. Quale & Malcom J. Tuesley, Space, the Final Frontier—Expanding 
FCC Regulation of Indecent Content onto Direct Broadcast Satellite, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 
37, 65–66 (2007) (arguing that any content-based regulation on DBS would likely be 
weighed with a strict scrutiny standard, making it unlikely that any indecency regulation 
could be upheld).   
 53 FCC, Regulation of Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FCC.GOV (last 
reviewed/updated Mar. 1, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ (noting that the 
agency has traditionally only enforced the Telecommunication Act‟s indecency 
provisions against broadcasters). 
 54 See Frank Ahrens, Senator Bids to Extend Indecency Rules to Cable, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 2, 2005, at E1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A64548-2005Mar1.html; Lisa de Moraes, CBS to FCC: Halftime Show 
Finale Was a Surprise to Us, Too, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2004, at C07, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35448-2004Nov8.html. 
 55 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:4. 
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address the overarching question of whether the FCC can still 
justifiably regulate otherwise protected televised speech. 
Perhaps the most significant development, at least insofar as 
the First Amendment is concerned, is one that is now over ten 
years old.  Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress 
mandated that all televisions larger than thirteen inches sold after 
January 1, 2000 must include a V-chip.
56
  The V-chip technology 
works with TV ratings in a manner that allows parents to block 
shows that they disfavor (based on the shows‟ ratings).57  
Nevertheless, while a V-chip is available in the vast majority of 
televisions currently in use, only a very small number of 
consumers actually utilize the technology.  One 2007 study found 
that while over eighty-two percent (82%) of parents had a V-chip-
equipped television, more than half weren‟t even aware their TVs 
actually included V-chips, and only sixteen percent (16%) had ever 
actually used one.
58
 
Other important changes have also occurred in the media 
environment.  First, the percentage of families that use broadcast 
signals for their television has plummeted.  Fewer than ten percent 
(10%) of families rely on broadcast transmissions for their 
television.
59
  Instead, the vast majority of consumers now receive 
their television transmissions via MVPDs like cable and satellite.
60
  
These pay-TV services typically include additional filtering 
capabilities for their customers.
61
  In fact, cable companies are 
 
 56 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551, 47 U.S.C. § 303(w) (2006). 
 57 FCC, V-Chip: Viewing Television Responsibly, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/ 
(last updated July 8, 2003).  The rating system was established as an industry initiative by 
the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association and 
the Motion Picture Association of America. Id.  The ratings are as follows (increasing in 
severity): TV-Y, TV-Y7, TV-G, TV-PG, TV-14, TV-MA. Id. 
 58 VICTORIA RIDEOUT, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PARENTS, CHILDREN & MEDIA: A 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY 9–10 (June 2007). 
 59 NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First Amendment 
Standard for the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 473 (2007) (“Parental 
controls are usually just one button-click away on most cable and satellite remote 
controls and boxes.”). See generally TVBOSS, www.thetvboss.org (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011) (demonstrating a television industry initiative that catalogs the various parental 
control options for cable and satellite customers); Parental Controls, TV PARENTAL 
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legally bound to provide blocking devices to their customers upon 
request,
62
 and most do so for free.
63
 
Second, American children are now exposed to a wide range of 
media that extend well beyond just broadcast television.  One 
recent study found that children ages eight to eighteen spend more 
than seven and a half hours per day consuming media, during 
which time they take in a whopping ten hours and forty-five 
minutes worth of content (through multitasking).
64
  While video is 
still the largest portion of their media consumption (four hours and 
twenty-nine minutes per day), more than forty percent (40%) of 
that video content is not traditional television; it “is either pre-
recorded or watched on such other platforms as computers, DVDs, 
cell phones, or iPods.”65 
Some prominent judicial opinions have explicitly suggested 
that because of these changes in technology and media 
consumption, broadcast regulations no longer merit special First 
Amendment treatment.  This position was recently advanced by 
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Fox v. FCC,
66
 and 
even more forcefully asserted by the Second Circuit when it heard 
the same case on remand.
67
  The case dealt with the FCC‟s 
punishment of “fleeting expletives,” or unscripted profanity that is 
transmitted during live broadcasts. 
 
GUIDELINES, http://www.tvguidelines.org/parentalcontrols.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011) (offering similar information). 
 62 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (2006) (“In order to restrict the viewing of programming 
which is obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall 
provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a 
particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber.”). 
 63 Images Children See on the Screen: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Telecomms. & the Internet, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Kyle McSlarrow, 
President and CEO, National Cable & Telecommunications Association), available at 
http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=602 (stating that “leading cable 
companies” serving more than 85% of the cable subscribers in the country had agreed to 
provide blocking technology for free). 
 64 VICTORIA RIDEOUT, ULLA G. FOEHR & DONALD F. ROBERTS, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, GENERATION M2: MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS 2 (2010).     
 65 Id. at 11. 
 66 Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67 Fox III, 613 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Although Justice Scalia declined to address the First 
Amendment issue in the majority opinion,
68
 Justice Thomas 
forcefully did so in his concurrence.  He questioned the very 
authority of the FCC to continue to regulate the content of 
broadcast programming.  He argued, as he had previously in 
Denver Area,
69
 that there was no textual basis to alter First 
Amendment protections across different media.
70
  Perhaps 
accepting that this textual interpretation had not curried favor with 
the rest of the Court, he proceeded to lay out a new argument as 
well: that “dramatic technological advances ha[d] eviscerated” the 
need for the Court to treat broadcast speech differently.
71
  He 
specifically took aim at both the scarcity and pervasiveness 
justifications, writing that the broadcast spectrum was no longer 
scarce, and that broadcast television was no longer uniquely 
pervasive since it had become just a small component of a 
multifaceted media landscape.
72
 
On remand, the Second Circuit took the baton from Justice 
Thomas, pausing for a lengthy tangent to question whether the 
Supreme Court‟s longstanding Pacifica doctrine should still be 
valid.
73
  The court specifically highlighted the advent of new 
 
 68 The majority ruled that the FCC‟s decision to begin treating fleeting expletives as 
actionable under its indecency policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Fox II, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1812.  The Court declined to address the lurking First Amendment issue because 
the Second Circuit had not “definitively rule[d] on the constitutionality of the 
Commission‟s orders.” Id. at 1819. 
 69 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70 Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1820–21 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 71 Id. at 1821. 
 72 Id. at 1821–22. 
 73 Fox III, 613 F.3d 317, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2010).  The arguments presented by the 
Second Circuit closely mirrored similar ones that it made in its initial opinion prior to 
rehearing by the Supreme Court. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I), 489 
F.3d 444, 465–66 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)  
[I]t is increasingly difficult to describe the broadcast media as 
uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some 
point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context 
of regulating broadcast television. . . . If the Playboy decision is any 
guide, technological advances may obviate the constitutional 
legitimacy of the FCC‟s robust oversight. 
Id.  
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media filters since the Pacifica decision came down in 1978, 
noting that “technological changes have given parents the ability to 
decide which programs they will permit their children to watch.”74  
In no uncertain terms, the court found that these technologies 
outmoded any need for broadcast speech to be given special First 
Amendment status.  The court explained, “[w]e can think of no 
reason why [the Supreme Court‟s] rationale for applying strict 
scrutiny in the case of cable television would not apply with equal 
force to broadcast television in light of the V-chip technology that 
is now available.”75  Although the court was not in a position to 
overturn the Supreme Court‟s Pacifica precedent,76 this lengthy 
denunciation of the doctrine in dicta was nevertheless an important 
shot across the bow of the Court‟s broadcast jurisprudence.  The 
Court apparently took notice, granting certiorari in late June 
2011.
77
 
Criticism regarding the lack of synthesis between modern 
technology and the Court‟s broadcast speech doctrine has not been 
confined to judicial opinions.  Several articles have similarly 
contested that the nation‟s broadcast policy is woefully behind the 
times, and that the advent of the Internet and digital media filters 
should allow broadcast speech to be deregulated.  These arguments 
can be separated into two distinct camps.  Some critics argue, as 
did Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit, that broadcast 
regulations should no longer be weighed with special intermediate 
scrutiny, but instead deserve treatment under the more rigid strict 
scrutiny test.
78
  Others go one step further, contending that the 
proliferation of media filters like the V-chip inherently presents a 
less restrictive means of protecting children from indecent 
content.
79
  These critics believe that any FCC content-based 
 
 74 Fox III, 613 F.3d at 326. 
 75 Id. at 327. 
 76 Id.  
 77 See generally Fox IV, 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011). 
 78 See, e.g., May, supra note 5, at 389–90 (writing that the Court should give 
broadcasters the same First Amendment strict scrutiny protections as other media 
sources). 
 79 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 30, at 1155 (suggesting that because the V-chip gives 
parents the ability to “protect” their children from unwanted television, “the government 
should henceforth be forbidden from engaging in other content-based regulation of 
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indecency regulation cannot survive a strict scrutiny test and 
consequently should be deemed unconstitutional. 
Surprisingly, there is little empirical data to support these 
conclusions.
80
  Both Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit spoke 
of technological change in general terms, but did not offer any 
specific evidence about how those changes actually impacted the 
control that parents had over indecent content, especially the 
minority of parents who choose to have only broadcast television 
in their homes.  In order to properly determine if the Court should 
continue to recognize broadcast television as a unique medium, 
there must be some empirical consideration of how parents with 
broadcast television feel about their level of control relative to 
other parents.  Similarly, there should be an empirical 
consideration of self-help technology alternatives like the V-chip 
in order to make a decision about less restrictive methods of 
achieving the government‟s compelling interest under the strict 
scrutiny test. 
At first blush, language from the Playboy decision seems to 
suggest that the courts should not be concerned with how self-help 
media filters are actually adopted or used for strict scrutiny 
analysis.  In identifying cable boxes as a less restrictive means to 
control signal bleed from indecent programming, the Court stated, 
It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a 
consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or 
may not go perfectly every time.  A court should 
not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative 
 
violence and indecency in the broadcast media”); Yoo, supra note 7, at 305 (arguing that 
“the V-chip constitutes a less restrictive means sufficient to render any ban on indecent 
speech unconstitutional”); Elizabeth H. Steele, Note, Examining the FCC’s Indecency 
Regulations in Light of Today’s Technology, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 307–10 (2010) 
(calling for total indecency deregulation); see also Editorial, Content Regulation: An 
Indecent Proposal, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 21, 2005, at 54, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/4198412 (arguing that indecency regulation should be 
abandoned entirely, in light of self-help technology and countervailing concerns about 
government censorship). 
 80 Justice Scalia underscored this gap in his majority opinion in Fox II.  While 
declining to address the First Amendment issues that were present in the case, he noted 
that the Second Circuit did not “demand empirical evidence” to support its pervasiveness 
argument. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). 
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would be ineffective; and a court should not 
presume parents, given full information, will fail to 
act.
81
 
This striking passage has not gone unnoticed and has been 
cited in subsequent decisions and law review articles arguing that 
self-help media filters must be recognized as a less restrictive 
means of controlling indecent content.
82
  However, a more careful 
analysis shows why it is wrong to interpret the Playboy decision to 
mean that the mere existence of any media filters presents a de 
facto bar against government media indecency regulation; 
empirical data must be considered if it is available. 
To start, it is clear that the Playboy Court was willing to 
examine data in order to determine whether blocking technology 
could be construed as a “plausible” or “effective” alternative to 
regulation.
83
  The Court‟s statement that it would not make 
assumptions about consumer behavior was largely driven by the 
fact that the government failed to provide it with any comparative 
evidence that went beyond mere “anecdote and supposition.”84  
The Court lamented that “[t]he record [was] silent as to the 
comparative effectiveness of the two alternatives.”85  Under the 
strict scrutiny standard, the government had a burden to show that 
its regulation was a less restrictive means of achieving the 
compelling interest of protecting children, a burden that it failed to 
meet.
86
  But its failure should by no means be construed to imply 
that it did not have the ability to present evidence about the extent 
 
 81 United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000). 
 82 See, e.g., Fox I, 489 F.3d 444, 465–66 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 129 
S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How 
Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 773 n.167 
(2003); Yoo, supra note 7, at 303–04. 
 83 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) 
(suggesting that the proper test is “whether the challenged regulation is the least 
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives”).  This language from Ashcroft 
serves as further proof of the Court‟s willingness to consider evidence about the efficacy 
of the various proposed means of achieving the compelling interest.  
 84 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822, 824. 
 85 Id. at 826. 
 86 Id. 
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to which the alternatives were more or less restrictive, or more or 
less effective at achieving the compelling interest at stake.  It did. 
Other recent cases similarly support the conclusion that the 
Court should rely heavily upon empirical evidence when 
evaluating the constitutionality of speech regulations.  A 
comparison to the Court‟s treatment of must-carry restrictions in 
Turner I
87
 and Turner II
88
 is illustrative.  In Turner I, the Court 
determined that the record was insufficient for it to make a proper 
assessment of whether must-carry provisions were constitutional 
under intermediate scrutiny.
89
  It therefore remanded the case to 
the District Court for the District of Columbia for additional fact-
finding.
90
  With more data to consider in Turner II, the Court 
reviewed the expanded record to determine “whether the must-
carry provisions were designed to address a real harm, and whether 
those provisions [would] alleviate [that harm] in a material way.”91  
In sum, the Turner cases suggest that courts should rely on 
empirical data for both intermediate and strict scrutiny First 
Amendment determinations, and should not hesitate to remand if 
the factual record does not provide sufficient information.
92
 
 
 87 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 622 (1994).  
 88 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner II”), 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
 89 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 667–68  
Because of the unresolved factual questions, the importance of the 
issues to the broadcast and cable industries, and the conflicting 
conclusions that the parties contend are to be drawn from the 
statistics and other evidence presented, we think it necessary to 
permit the parties to develop a more thorough factual record, and to 
allow the District Court to resolve any factual disputes remaining, 
before passing upon the constitutional validity of the challenged 
provisions. 
Id.  
 90 Id. at 668.  
 91 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195. 
 92 See Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases 
After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2319 (1998).  To the extent that 
Congress has provided specific interpretations of data in support of content-neutral 
regulations, the Court will frequently heed those interpretations. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 
at 224 (“We cannot displace Congress‟ judgment respecting content-neutral regulations 
with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings supported 
by evidence that is substantial for a legislative determination.”).  Justice Breyer 
expounded upon this point in his recent Brown dissent, arguing that the Court has a 
history of deferring to the factual findings of the legislature, and contending that the 
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Finally, it should be a matter of common sense that courts 
would be willing to evaluate data regarding competing alternatives 
under a strict scrutiny assessment.  It would be illogical to ignore 
reliable data that could help to make a more informed comparison 
between technology and the regulation it might supplant,
93
 at least 
when such data is available.
94
  After all, there are scores of 
conceivable reasons why a media filter might not be deemed an 
effective alternative to regulation: it might be inordinately complex 
to use, prohibitively expensive to procure, or obscure and 
unavailable for widespread use.  The point is that any honest 
analysis of the extent to which new technology can be an adequate 
substitute for content regulation must consider data about its 
adoption and efficacy in practice. 
II. METHODS 
In early 2011, I delivered an online survey to a random sample 
of 575 parents who had children under the age of eighteen living at 
home.  The survey included questions on a range of topics related 
to technology and media regulation.  Parents are the most 
appropriate survey target for this kind of analysis because they are 
the population that Pacifica aimed to assist; the government 
interest at stake deals directly with facilitating parental control 
over their children‟s exposure to indecent media.95  The 
 
Court should have done so in the case of regulations regarding violent video games. 
Brown v. Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
But his was the minority view in that case.  The majority decision tilted in the other 
direction, suggesting that the Court will instead make its own independent assessment of 
the data. Id. at 2738–39 (discussing the shortcomings of California‟s factual showing 
regarding video game violence).   
 93 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 8 (1998) (arguing that the Court‟s constitutional jurisprudence would be more 
aligned with reality if there were closer attention paid “to the likely consequences of its 
decisions and to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines”).   
 94 See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 
(1998) (describing “the lack of an empirical footing” as the “Achilles heel of 
constitutional law,” but noting that in some cases, “ignorance is irremediable”). 
 95 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) (underscoring the 
government‟s interest “in the „well-being of its youth‟ and in supporting „parents‟ claim 
to authority in their own household‟”) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
637–41 (1968)).  See also Balkin, supra note 30, at 1137–39 (explaining the fundamental 
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government has no interest in regulating indecent content that 
parents want their children to see.
96
  Thus, parents are the front-
line arbiters and are best able to gauge how pervasive television 
content is to children in modern American homes, and whether 
self-help technology like media filters is an effective solution to 
keep this unwanted indecent content at bay. 
Although the sample was random, whites were overrepresented 
in the respondent population. Eighty-two percent (82%) of 
respondents identified as white.  Because there was a statistically 
significant relationship between race and perspectives on media 
regulation for some questions, I weighted the data to reflect a more 
representative racial distribution.
97
 
I then analyzed the data, frequently employing the Pearson Chi 
Square test.  This test is one of the most common methods of 
statistical analysis used to evaluate the probability that the 
connection between two categorical variables is due to an actual 
relationship and not the product of random chance.
98
  The survey 
had a margin of error of plus or minus four percent (+/- 4%).
99
  
 
importance of parental control in justifying content-based regulation for broadcast 
media). 
 96 United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (noting that 
“the Government disclaims any interest in preventing children from seeing or hearing 
[Playboy‟s programming] with the consent of their parents”). 
 97 The data were weighted so that the racial breakdown was sixty-five percent (65%) 
white and thirty-five percent (35%) non-white, consistent with the most recent Census 
data available. U.S. Census Bureau, B03002. Hispanic or Latino Origin by Race, 2009 
American Community Survey, CENSUS.GOV, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ 
TTable?_bm=y&-ds_name=ACS_ 2009_1YR_G00_&-_geoSkip=0&-CONTEXT=dt&-
mt_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C03002&-redoLog=false&-_skip=0&-geo_id=010 
00US&-_showChild=Y&-format=&-_lang=en&_toggle=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C030 
02 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  This weighting had a marked effect on the political 
affiliation of the respondents.  Although the survey originally yielded twenty-nine percent 
(29%) Republican, twenty-nine percent (29%) Democrat, and twenty-three percent (23%) 
Independent, after the racial weighting, the breakdown shifted to twenty-five percent 
(25%) Republican, thirty-five percent (35%) Democrat, and twenty-two percent (22%) 
Independent.  For more background on weighting in survey research, see ALAN 
BUCKINGHAM & PETER SAUNDERS, THE SURVEY METHODS WORKBOOK: FROM DESIGN TO 
ANALYSIS 119 (2004). 
 98 BUCKINGHAM & SAUNDERS, supra note 97, at 241. 
 99 As with all studies, the margin of error fluctuates with each specific question, 
especially those that were only answered by a subset of the total sample.   
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The numbers that follow in Part IV generally are percentages of 
valid responses only, excluding responses such as “don‟t know” 
and “prefer not to answer.”100 
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Should Restrictions on Broadcast Speech be Subject to Strict 
Scrutiny? 
The first important question to answer is whether broadcast 
television is still the unique medium it was in 1978 when the Court 
decided Pacifica.  The empirical answer appears to be that it is not.  
Several different metrics from this study suggest that broadcast 
should no longer be singled out for its privileged degree of 
intermediate scrutiny. 
First, there was no statistically significant relationship between 
television delivery type and parental satisfaction with control over 
unwanted television content.
101
  In other words, parents do not 
seem to think that broadcast television is a uniquely pervasive 
medium, relative to other delivery channels (cable, satellite, or 
fiber).  There was only an eight percent (8%) difference in 
satisfaction with control between parents who received their 
television signal only via broadcast (“broadcast parents”),102 and 
those who received it via other means (“non-broadcast parents”); 
seventy-seven percent (77%) and eighty-five percent (85%) were 
 
 100 I have noted instances where the percentage of non-valid responses was over ten 
percent (10%). 
 101 See infra Table 1.  Note that the racial weighting may have had a disproportionate 
effect on this result because all non-white respondents who received broadcast signals 
said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their control.  If the comparison is 
made without weighting, then the relationship is significant at the ten percent (10%) 
level, but is still arguably insubstantial, as there is only a ten percent (10%) difference in 
satisfaction with control.  Furthermore, there is not a statistically significant difference 
between whites and non-whites in satisfaction with control across all television delivery 
channels, which suggests that the skewed response to that particular question among the 
non-white broadcast set was just an enigma. 
 102 Eleven percent (11%) of respondents in this study reported that they received the 
television signal in their homes via broadcast.  However, some of these respondents also 
used other delivery mechanisms for their television content.  Seven percent (7%) of 
respondents stated that they relied upon broadcast only for their television. 
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satisfied, respectively.
103
  Thus, the study suggests that the 
perception of parental control is nearly identical between parents 
whose children watch programming that is regulated by the FCC 
and those whose children watch programming that is not.
104
 
Second, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between television delivery type and parental concerns about 
inappropriate content exposure.  Broadcast parents did not have 
significantly unique concerns about the amount of adult language, 
sexual content, or violent content to which their children were 
exposed on television, whether taken individually or grouped 
together as “inappropriate content.”105  In fact, the differences in 
ratings were so small that the results for some of these 
comparisons were about as statistically insignificant as can 
possibly be calculated.
106
  Furthermore, these parental feelings 
were not merely similar across television delivery alternatives; the 
percentages of concerned parents from my study were comparable 
 
 103 See infra Table 1.  On the other hand, there was a statistically significant 
relationship between television delivery type and parental satisfaction with the 
government‟s regulation of unwanted programming.  Parents who received broadcast 
only were much more likely to be dissatisfied with the government‟s regulation of 
television programming.  However, it would be inappropriate to answer the First 
Amendment question based on opinions regarding regulatory satisfaction; that would be 
akin to putting the cart before the horse.  The Pacifica logic is based upon notions of 
parental control, so responses regarding their perceptions of control should be 
determinative here. 
 104 The FCC currently only imposes content-based fines on broadcasters. FCC, 
Regulation, supra note 52 (“With respect to cable and satellite services, Congress has 
charged the Commission with enforcing the statutory prohibition against airing indecent 
programming „by means of radio communications.‟  The Commission has historically 
interpreted this restriction to apply to radio and television broadcasters, and has never 
extended it to cover cable operators.  In addition, because cable and satellite services are 
subscription-based, viewers of these services have greater control over the programming 
content that comes into their homes, whereas broadcast content traditionally has been 
available to any member of the public with a radio or television.”). 
 105 See infra Table 2.  Overall, seventy-eight percent (78%) of parents were concerned 
or very concerned about exposure to violent content, eighty-one percent (81%) about 
exposure to sexual content, and seventy-three percent (73%) about exposure to adult 
language.   
 106 See infra Table 2.  For instance, the Fisher‟s Exact test result for violent content was 
0.999999999999786, implying that there is only a 0.0000000000324% chance that the 
data support a finding of a relationship between television delivery and concerns about 
television exposure to violence.   
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to those from a recent Kaiser study that asked parents about all 
media exposure (including, for example, the Internet).
107
 
Thus, while the FCC continues to impose fines on broadcasters 
under the guise that the medium is pervasive and is uniquely 
accessible to children, the statistics suggest that broadcast 
television has truly become a homogenous part of the media 
landscape.  The longstanding Pacifica principle that broadcasting 
is different lacks any significant empirical support among parents 
in this study.  Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to hear a 
challenge to content-based restrictions on broadcast television, it 
should close the book on Pacifica and its special intermediate 
scrutiny carve-out, and apply a traditional strict scrutiny test 
instead. 
B. Are Media Filters like the V-chip a Less Restrictive Means of 
Achieving the Government’s Interests in Regulating Broadcast 
Speech? 
Having established that regulations on broadcast television 
should be evaluated using strict scrutiny, the logical next question 
is whether the proliferation of media filters like the V-chip presents 
a less restrictive means than regulation to protect children from 
indecent or profane television content.  The empirical answer from 
this study is a nuanced yes.  While parents would generally prefer 
to have both media filters and government regulation, they admit 
that the filters are just as effective as regulation by itself.  
Therefore, if asked to apply a strict scrutiny test, the Court should 
rule that it is unconstitutional for the FCC to continue to regulate 
either indecency or profanity on television. 
As a preliminary matter, the data support earlier findings that 
the V-chip suffers from inadequate public awareness and 
adoption.
108
  Only fifty-nine percent (59%) of respondents had 
heard of the V-chip before taking this survey.  While eighty-six 
 
 107 See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 24 (reporting that eighty percent (80%) of parents 
were somewhat concerned or very concerned about exposure to violent content, seventy-
seven percent (77%) about sexual content, and seventy-seven percent (77%) about adult 
language). 
 108 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PARENTS AND THE V-CHIP 2001: A KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION SURVEY 1 (2001); RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 9–10.  
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percent (86%) of respondents had purchased a TV since January 1, 
2000 (when the V-chip rule went into effect), only thirty-eight 
percent (38%) of them knew that their TV had a V-chip, and only 
15% of them reported that their family had ever actually used the 
V-chip.  These figures are especially striking considering that 
when the device was first conceived, seventy-two percent (72%) of 
Americans said they would use a V-chip “often” or “once in 
awhile” if they had the technology.109  Comparing these numbers 
to those from Kaiser‟s 2007 study, it seems that general awareness 
of the V-chip has decreased (from seventy percent (70%) to fifty-
nine percent (59%)), although the usage percentages are still 
approximately the same among those with equipped televisions.
110
  
Those who actually use their V-chip technology are quite content; 
ninety-eight percent (98%) of respondents who had used a V-chip 
said it was either “somewhat useful” or “very useful” in helping 
them filter inappropriate content from their children.
111
  But the 
overarching problem remains: with the majority of Americans 
unaware that their TVs have V-chip technology, it is a stretch to 
believe that the V-chip alone is a realistic alternative to regulation. 
However, the V-chip does not exist in a vacuum, and many 
other media filters have sprung up in its wake.  More than sixty-
three percent (63%) of the survey respondents reported that they 
had some other filtering device that they could use to block 
unwanted programming (whether a cable box, DVR, satellite box, 
or something else).
112
  In contrast to the V-chip‟s poor usage, 
seventy-one percent (71%) of cable box owners had used their 
devices, along with seventy-seven percent (77%) of DVR owners, 
sixty-three percent (63%) of satellite box owners, and thirty-four 
 
 109 JEFFREY D. STANGER & NATALIA GRIDINA, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, 
MEDIA IN THE HOME 1999: THE FOURTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN 24 
(1999). 
 110 See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 19; infra Table 3. It appears as though V-chip 
awareness may have peaked in 2007.  This is likely attributable at least in part to growth 
of media filter alternatives (such as DVRs). 
 111 See infra, Table 4. 
 112 This figure does not include another ten percent (10%) of respondents who were not 
sure.  Excluding those respondents, over seventy-three percent (73%) said they had 
another filtering device. 
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percent (34%) of owners with some other filtering device.
113
  
Moreover, seventy percent (70%) of cable box owners found their 
device to be at least a “somewhat useful” means of blocking 
programming that they did not want their children to see, along 
with seventy percent (70%) of DVR owners, sixty-seven percent 
(67%) of satellite box owners, and forty-seven percent (47%) of 
other device owners.
114
  Thus, these separate devices were used 
much more widely than the V-Chip, although they were also found 
to be less helpful.  This is likely due to the fact that the devices are 
less utility-focused than the V-chip because they are not designed 
solely for the purpose of filtering unwanted programming. 
Nevertheless, in spite of their prevailing satisfaction with filter 
technology, the majority of respondents stated that they still 
wanted the government to continue to regulate broadcast content.  
More than sixty-five percent (65%) wanted continued regulation of 
obscenity and indecency, and more than sixty percent (60%) 
wanted continued regulation of profanity.
115
  Only about eighteen 
percent (18%) of respondents thought that the government should 
relax obscenity and indecency restrictions because of technology, 
and only about twenty-one percent (21%) for profanity; the 
remainder thought regulations should be relaxed for other 
reasons.
116
  Broadcast television users did not have significantly 
different responses to these questions than the MPVD users. 
Most importantly however, eighty-one percent (81%) of 
respondents thought that technology like the V-chip was an equally 
effective or better alternative to government regulation for 
controlling the programming that they did not want their children 
to watch.
117
  This finding is damning for content-based broadcast 
 
 113 See infra Table 4. 
 114 See infra Table 4. 
 115 See infra Table 5.  The number of invalid responses was particularly high for this 
line of questions; nearly twelve percent (12%) of respondents did not have an opinion on 
this subject.  For a hypothesis as to why that might be the case, see infra Section IV(c). 
 116 See infra Table 5. 
 117 See infra Table 6.  As with the prior data, there was a high number of invalid 
responses because a significant number of respondents (17%) answered “don‟t know.”  It 
is important to remember that these responses were given in a world in which the 
government does regulate.  To some extent, that might implicate the extent to which these 
individuals are able to fully envision the implications of a world devoid of regulation.  On 
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regulation.  The parents that Pacifica strove to assist seem to think 
that its regulatory progeny is less effective than less-restrictive 
self-help media filter alternatives. 
The strong response to this question is especially noteworthy 
when considered in light of prior research that has shown that a 
significant majority of adults believe that parents, rather than the 
federal government, should be primarily responsible for screening 
inappropriate content from their children.
118
  It appears that parents 
now have the technological capability, and the resulting burden, to 
do so.
119
 
Some may find this answer to be incongruent with the pro-
regulation survey responses discussed above.  On one hand, most 
parents say that they want continued content-based government 
regulation of broadcast television,
120
 in spite of new media filter 
technology.  On the other hand, the vast majority of parents say 
that the new technologies are at least as effective as government 
regulation.
121
  This tension is reflective of the extent to which 
majoritarian parental perspectives stand at odds with the minority-
protective First Amendment strict scrutiny test.  While parents may 
have an “any means necessary” mentality when it comes to 
protecting their children from objectionable content, that position 
is incongruent with the “least restrictive means” standard used by 
the Supreme Court.  Put another way, content-based restrictions 
could always inch cumulatively closer towards fulfilling a 
compelling government goal, but the Supreme Court‟s First 
Amendment strict scrutiny test imposes a limit.  The Court 
explained this distinction in Ashcroft: 
 
the other hand, respondents might have been aware that cable and satellite programming 
is not regulated for indecency or profanity.    
 118 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, NEW CONCERNS ABOUT INTERNET 
AND REALITY SHOWS: SUPPORT FOR TOUGHER INDECENCY MEASURES, BUT WORRIES 
ABOUT GOVERNMENT INTRUSIVENESS 2 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://people-press.org/ 
reports/pdf/241.pdf.  The margin in this particular study was about twenty-to-one. 
 119 Bell, supra note 81, at 778 (noting that “each time that courts . . . limit state action, 
they impose on each of us the responsibility for adopting the new and improved self-help 
technologies that render such state action obsolete”).   
 120 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 121 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
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The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is 
restricted no further than necessary to achieve the 
goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate 
speech is not chilled or punished.  For that reason, 
the test does not begin with the status quo of 
existing regulations, then ask whether the 
challenged restriction has some additional ability to 
achieve Congress‟ legitimate interest.  Any 
restriction on speech could be justified under that 
analysis.  Instead, the court should ask whether the 
challenged regulation is the least restrictive means 
among available, effective alternatives.
122
 
Because parents recognize that media filters like the V-Chip 
are a more effective method of controlling objectionable television 
content, and because the V-Chip and other media filters are now 
widely available, the regulatory alternative of content-based 
penalties should be considered unconstitutional. 
C. Improving Media Filters 
In looking for a more robust understanding of parental 
perspectives on technology and media regulation, one concept to 
consider is what I term “consumer transparency.”  The television 
filters and regulations that are most successful are those that are 
obvious or transparent to consumers through their ordinary TV 
consumption.  The media filters and regulations that are less 
obvious appear to be less helpful.
123
 
The consumer transparency hypothesis can offer insight into 
several different aspects of this survey.  For instance, a significant 
majority of respondents were familiar with the national TV rating 
system.  About seventy-eight percent (78%) thought that the 
ratings were a good idea.  This could be because the ratings have a 
high degree of consumer transparency because they appear at the 
start of every TV show.  In contrast, there is less consumer 
 
 122 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 
 123 It is important to note that the data do not dispositively support a consumer 
transparency theory.  This is simply a hypothesis intended to bring some cohesion to the 
survey results. 
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transparency about who actually sets the ratings; only forty-four 
percent (44%) of the survey respondents correctly answered that 
the television industry bears that responsibility.  This regulatory 
ambivalence (or apathy) was also evident in some questions asking 
for perspectives about regulation.  Throughout the study, 
significantly more respondents answered “don‟t know” to 
questions about regulation than to those about respondent behavior 
or perceptions of control. 
The consumer transparency hypothesis extends to devices as 
well.  In spite of the fact that the V-chip is the most widely-
distributed media filter (included in virtually every television on 
the market since 2000),
124
 it is far from being the most well-
known.  Significantly more parents were familiar with media filter 
devices that are required for ordinary operation of a television 
(such as a cable box) than the less-obvious V-chip that has 
continued to remain shrouded from consumers. 
The hypothesis can also help to explain consumer responses 
regarding the intricacies and regulation of television delivery 
systems.  For example, the differences between the broadcast and 
cable viewing experiences are largely imperceptible.
125
  Although 
the Playboy Court distinguished between delivery systems by 
noting that cable companies can filter their signals on a household-
by-household basis,
126
 that difference is not obvious to the viewer.  
Nearly twenty-five percent (25%) of cable customers in the survey 
did not know that they could request that a channel to be cut off by 
their service provider.  Furthermore, most cable customers have no 
input on the basic set of channels they receive due to the cable 
industry‟s tiered pricing structure.  The lack of a transparent 
difference between delivery systems could be one reason why 
 
 124 FCC,  supra note 57.  
 125 Michael K. Powell, Comm‟r, FCC, The Public Interest Standard: A New 
Regulator‟s Search for Enlightenment, American Bar Association 17th Annual Legal 
Forum on Communications Law (Apr. 5, 1998), available at http://transition. 
fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp806.html (“Technology has evaporated any meaningful 
distinctions among distribution medi[a], making it unsustainable for the courts to 
segregate broadcasting from other medi[a] for First Amendment purposes. It is just 
fantastic to maintain that the First Amendment changes as you click through the channels 
on your television set.”).  
 126 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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fifty-three percent (53%) of the parents responded that the 
government should regulate broadcast and cable in the same 
way,
127
 and why there were no substantive differences across 
delivery systems in parental perception of unwanted content.
128
  
On a basic level, television consumption is largely homogenous 
across delivery systems. 
If the FCC‟s content-based regulations are ultimately deemed 
unconstitutional, there will likely be an even stronger private 
demand for media filters.  Parents want to take control of filtering, 
and are concerned about the amount of exposure that their children 
have to undesirable content.  The most effective media filters will 
likely be the ones that are conspicuous within normal consumer 
television use.  Similarly, consumers will be more likely to 
understand regulations that are based on principles of consumer 
transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court has the opportunity to re-evaluate 
content-based broadcast regulation, the justices should turn to 
empirical evidence to help answer two critical First Amendment 
questions.  First, is broadcast television still so uniquely pervasive 
that parents lack control over the content that their children watch?  
The results from this study strongly suggest that it is not; parents in 
broadcast households do not have significantly different 
perceptions of control than parents in households with MPVD 
services.  Therefore, the age of Pacifica is over, and intermediate 
scrutiny should be abandoned in the broadcast context. 
Second, are media filters an effective, less restrictive means of 
helping these parents control inappropriate content on television 
from reaching their children?  The data show that parents 
overwhelmingly believe media filter technology is an effective 
alternative to government regulation.  And self-help technology is 
 
 127 In fact, another twenty-two percent (22%) of respondents believed that the 
government should regulate cable more than it currently does, although not as strictly as 
broadcast. 
 128 See supra Section IV.A. 
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clearly less restrictive on speech than content-based broadcast 
regulation.  Therefore, indecency regulation cannot stand up to a 
strict scrutiny test. 
One important lesson to take from this analysis is that 
empirical studies can offer critical insights about the propriety of 
media regulation.  To that end, there are many avenues for future 
study.  It would be useful to perform a mixed-mode survey to build 
upon these results, and protect against the inherent kinds of bias 
that are included with any kind of single-medium study (in this 
case, the Internet).  Given that the number of broadcast-only 
households is dwindling, it could also be appropriate to do a more 
focused study that would target that population specifically.  Such 
studies could help the Court achieve a more robust understanding 
of real-world implications when balancing the efficacy of 
government speech interests against self-help technology. 
 
APPENDIX 
A. Table 1 – Satisfaction with Control Over Unwanted Content 
Question: How satisfied are you with your ability to control 
your children‟s access to TV programming that you don‟t want 
your children to watch? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
Satisfied 77% 85% 
Not Satisfied 23% 15% 
N: 526 
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 0.224 
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Question: How satisfied are you with the government‟s 
regulation of programming that you don‟t want your children 
to watch? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
Satisfied 41.7% 61.5% 
Not Satisfied 58.3% 38.5% 
N: 478 
Fisher‟s Exact Sig: 0.022 
B. Table 2 – Pervasiveness of Unwanted Content 
Question: How concerned are you that your children are being 
exposed to too much . . . Violent content on television? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
Not 
Concerned 
22.2% 21.6% 
Concerned 77.8% 78.4% 
N: 545 
Fisher‟s Exact Sig: 1.000 
Sexual content on television? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
Not 
Concerned 
22.2% 18.3% 
Concerned 77.8% 81.7% 
N: 544 
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 0.512 
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Adult language on television? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
Not 
Concerned 
27.8% 27.4% 
Concerned 72.2% 72.6% 
N: 544 
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 1.000 
Question: How much inappropriate content do you think your 
children are exposed to on TV? 
  
Broadcast 
Only 
Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or 
Multiple 
 A Lot 27% 25% 
 Some 38% 44% 
 Only a Little 22% 24% 
 None at All 14% 7% 
N: 536 
Pearson‟s Chi Square Sig.: 0.428 
C. Table 3 – V-Chip Usage 
Question: Have you or another adult in your houseful ever 
programmed your V-Chip to block shows you don‟t want your 
children to watch? 
  
2011 
(This Study) 
2007 
(Kaiser) 
2004 
(Kaiser) 
2001 
(Kaiser) 
Yes, Have Used V-
Chip 
12% 16% 15% 7% 
No, Have Not 
Used V-Chip / Not 
Sure 
38% 21% 20% 12% 
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Not Aware TV Has 
V-Chip 
36% 45% 39% 21% 
Did Not Purchase 
New TV Since 
1/1/00 
14% 18% 26% 60% 
N: 560 
D. Table 4 - Usefulness of Media Filters 
 
Question: Some people have TV parental controls other than 
the V-chip that allows them to block certain shows or channels 
. . . How often do you use these other devices? 
 
 
Cable 
Box DVR 
Satellite 
Box Other 
Use 71% 77% 63% 34% 
Never use 29% 23% 37% 66% 
N 276 304 258 202 
 
Question: How useful have these screening devices been in 
blocking programming that you don‟t want your children to 
watch? 
 
  V-Chip 
Cable 
Box DVR 
Satellite 
Box Other 
At least 
somewhat useful 98% 70% 70% 67% 47% 
N 69 234 237 189 141 
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E. Table 5 – Future Television Content Regulation 
Question: Some people say that the availability of content 
filtering technology like the V-chip means that the government 
should not need to continue to regulate broadcast TV 
programming for ____, regardless of filtering technology like 
the V-chip.  How do you think technology like the V-chip 
should affect broadcast regulations for ____.* 
 
  Obscenity Indecency Profanity 
Gov‟t Should Relax Regs 
b/c of Tech 
18% 18% 21% 
Gov‟t Should Relax Regs 
for Other Reasons 
14% 15% 16% 
Gov‟t Should Continue to 
Regulate 
67% 67% 63% 
TOTAL  100% 100% 100% 
N 468 469 475 
*Respondents were presented with FCC definitions for obscenity, 
indecency, and profanity.  For those definitions, see supra note 14. 
Note: A significant number of respondents (about 12%) answered 
“don‟t know” for each of these questions. 
F. Table 6 – Technology as an Alternative to Regulation 
Question: To what extent do you believe that technology like 
the V-chip is an effective alternative to government regulation 
of TV programming that you don‟t want your children to 
watch? 
Much more effective 15% 
More effective 30% 
Equally effective 36% 
Less effective 14% 
Much less effective 5% 
N: 456 
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Note: A significant number of respondents (about 17%) answered 
“don‟t know” for this question. 
 
